Dr. David S. Hardin
Longwood University
August 29, 2003
On May 1, President Bush used a spectacular photo opportunity aboard the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln to declare that major combat operations were at an end in Iraq. On August 25 (117 days later), the accidental deaths of two soldiers pushed the total number of American casualties in post-war Iraq past the number of wartime casualties for the first time. This analysis focuses on the number and nature of casualties suffered by American troops in Iraq after “victory” was declared on May 1. Of primary concern are the daily tally and rate of casualties, the nature of the incidents in terms of the types of hostile and non-hostile causes, and the location of the casualties. Graphs of the distribution of total hostile and non-hostile casualties over time and weekly casualty figures are provided, along with a map of Iraq showing the number and location of all casualties. The purpose here is to provide a breakdown of the available raw data, which is derived from press releases from the Department of Defense, US Central Command (CENTCOM), and human interest stories from the Associated Press. It is not the author’s intention to draw any conclusions about the state of affairs in Iraq; the data presented here could conceivably be used to support both proponents and opponents of the current policy in Iraq.
Between May 1 and August 25, 139 soldiers died in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 71 were from hostile actions and 68 were from causes unrelated to combat. By comparison, deaths from all causes during the war itself totaled 138. Of the wartime casualties, the vast majority (115) were the result of hostile actions and only 23 were from non-hostile incidents. The difference between wartime and post-war casualties, therefore, was that our forces sustained a slower rate of casualties (an average of a bit more than a death a day) after victory was declared and casualties from hostile actions and by non-hostile means were roughly equal over the entire period.
Although roughly equal over the 117 days, there was a distinctive trend in the ratio of hostile to non-hostile casualties between May 1 and August 25. Early on, casualties not involving hostile actions were most common (see Figure 1). During the first half of the period (May 1-June 28), non-hostile casualties accounted for 52% of all deaths. Non-hostile deaths occurred as a result of several causes, including vehicular accidents, accidental weapons discharges, drownings, falls, illnesses, and possibly suicides. Bad roads and chaotic traffic patterns are as dangerous in Iraq as they are anywhere else and the size of military vehicles makes crashes more severe and therefore more deadly. Vehicular accidents accounted for 20.9% of all fatalities and 42.6% of all non-hostile casualties, making that the second leading cause of deaths in Iraq. Iraq may prove to be a difficult posting, especially during the summer months. Illnesses of different kinds were the second leading cause of non-hostile casualties, including heat stress (as many as 4 deaths), a pneumonia-like affliction (2 deaths), and a variety of afflictions that killed as many as 4 others. Accidental discharges of weapons, which claimed 8 lives, were the third leading cause of non-hostile casualties. Perhaps the oddest accidental death was that of Spc. James I. Lambert III. On July 31, Lambert fell victim to a dangerous tradition in this part of the world: the discharge of weapons during celebrations. Lambert had the misfortune of being struck by a stray bullet fired randomly in the air during a boisterous Iraqi party in Baghdad.
As the weeks wore on, casualties from hostile actions became much more common (see Figures 1 and 2). In mid-August it was reported that an average of 12 attacks on American forces were recorded daily. As a result, hostilities rose from accounting for 48% of all casualties in the first half of the period to claiming 53% in the second half (June 29-August 25). As a whole, deaths from hostile actions accounted for 51.1% of all fatalities in Iraq between May 1 and August 25. Because of the sheer size of the country (Iraq is about the size of California) and the limitation on our deployment of troops, our forces did not and still do not control all of Iraq (a major point of contention in the debate over post-war policy). As a result, ambushes of convoys, checkpoints, and other posts were the most common causes of casualties overall, representing 29.4% of all fatalities and 57.7% of all deaths from hostile acts. Rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) were one of the favorite weapons of Iraqi guerillas, accounting for the deaths of at least 17 soldiers (12.2% of all casualties; 23.9% of deaths from hostile actions). In a chilling precursor of later events, "improvised explosive devices," remotely detonated explosives, and car and truck bombs became increasingly common, killing 15 troopers (19.7% of all hostile action casualties). Contrastingly, it may be that in Iraq the best defense is a good offense: deaths from combat operations initiated by US forces during the period - such as the hunting down and killing of Uday and Qusay Hussein - were few in number (8) and accounted for only 5.8% and 11.3% of all casualties and hostile casualties respectively.
In terms of the spatial distribution of casualties, the largest death toll was in Central Iraq, where minority Sunni muslims and Saddam loyalists are concentrated. The largest number of deaths occurred in Baghdad, where 40 soldiers (28.7% of the total) were killed - 28 of them in hostile acts. Baghdad has the largest number of troops posted and is the largest city in the country, so the close proximity of so many of our troops and so many Iraqi civilians with hostile intents makes casualties more likely. Urban environments also are more conducive to hit-and-run guerilla strikes because attackers can fade easily in and out of the local population and narrow city streets can cause troops to bunch up, presenting good targets. Additionally, urban environments are the perfect setting for the use of car bombs and remotely-detonated explosive devices, as was seen in the bombings of the Jordanian Embassy and United Nations headquarters in Baghdad. Although the scale is smaller, supply lines and posts in smaller settlements were and remain dangerous places as well. As a whole, 9 fatalities made Mosul the second deadliest place to be, followed by Al Hillah with 8 casualties. In both cases, however, non-hostile casualties far outweighed those from hostile actions. Al Fallujah and Ar Ramadi - west of Baghdad along the Euphrates River - were a distant second to Baghdad in hostile casualties with 4 apiece (see Figure 3).
Note on sources: the data for this study comes from the periodic press releases on casualties issued by CENTCOM and the Department of Defense and from Associated Press articles. They typically list the soldier's name, rank, military branch, age, hometown, and the date, location, and nature of the incident. Not all of them list the actual location in Iraq (14 did not). The cause of death is sometimes either not listed or is obscure; the exact cause of 12 deaths - 8.6% of the total number - must be listed as "unknown." Significantly, all 12 unknown causes of death seem to have been the result of non-hostile actions and have been classified as such. Uncertainty as to cause creates a discrepancy between my numbers for hostile action casualties (71) and those released by CENTCOM and reported in the media. Terrance Neilan reported in an article in the New York Times on August 26 that two conflicting sets of numbers were being quoted: Lt. Ryan Fitzgerald of CENTCOM at McDill Air Force Base released figures of 62 hostile and 77 non-hostile casualties from may 1 to August 25; Spec. Nicole Thompson of the Coalition Operations Center in Baghdad put the numbers at 63 hostile and 76 non-hostile casualties. Obviously, they have information I do not have. For example, there were 6 cases of casualties from exploding ordinance. The circumstances of those incidents have not been made available. Handling enemy ordinance - especially stocks as poorly maintained as the Iraqi's - is often as dangerous as clearing active minefields. My assumption is that the 5 explosions in Iraqi were in enemy weapons caches; I am considering them deaths from hostile activity. Mishandling our own ordinance falls under the category of a "non-hostile" accident, as was the case in the death of a sailor in Kuwait. The helicopter crash that killed 3 Army men in Samarrah on May 9 has been attributed to enemy fire and therefore I have classified their deaths as combat-related. The death of Spec. Lambert is listed as an accident; there is no evidence that he was intentionally targeted. Until CENTCOM and DoD designate which deaths were considered to be hostile and which non-hostile, I will maintain my overall figures.
Figure 1
Figure 2
Figure 3
Figures are for all casualties
from May 1 to August 25, 2003
Base map source: Central
Intelligence Agency